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The Law of Implicit Bias
Christine Jollst
Cass R. Sunsteintt
Considerableattention has been given to the Implicit Association Test
(IA T), which finds that most people have an implicit and unconscious bias
against members of traditionallydisadvantagedgroups.Implicit bias poses
a special challengefor antidiscriminationlaw because it suggests the possibility that people are treating others differently even when they are unaware that they are doing so. Some aspects of current law operate,
whether intentionally or not, as controls on implicit bias; it is possible to
imagine other efforts in that vein. An underlying suggestion is that implicit
bias might be controlled through a generalstrategy of "debiasingthrough
law."
INTRODUCTION

Consider two pairs of problems:
IA. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new restrictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the agency
believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the end they
support the restrictions on the basis of a study suggesting that cloned
mammals are likely to prove unhealthy for human consumption. The study
turns out to be based on palpable errors.
1B. A regulatory agency is deciding whether to impose new restrictions on cloning mammals for use as food. Most people within the agency
believe that the issue is an exceedingly difficult one, but in the end they
support the restrictions on the basis of a "gut feeling" that cloned mammals
are likely to be unhealthy to eat. It turns out that the "gut feeling," spurred
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by a widely publicized event appearing to establish serious risk, is impossible to support by reference to evidence.
2A. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith to a
supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is African-American.
The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but it chooses
Jones on the ground that employees and customers will be "more
comfortable" with a white employee in the supervisory position.
2B. An employer is deciding whether to promote Jones or Smith to a
supervisory position at its firm. Jones is white; Smith is African-American.
The employer thinks that both employees are excellent, but it chooses
Jones on the basis of a "gut feeling" that Jones would be better for the job.
The employer is not able to explain the basis for this gut feeling; it simply
thinks that "Jones is a better fit." The employer did not consciously think
about racial issues in making this decision; but, in fact, Smith would have
been chosen if both candidates had been white.
In case 1A, the agency is violating standard principles of administrative law. Its decision lacks a "rational connection between facts and judgment"1 and, thus, is most unlikely to survive judicial review. In case lB,
the agency is in at least equal difficulty; administrative choices must receive support from relevant scientific evidence.2
The second pair of cases is analytically parallel. Case 2A involves a
conscious and deliberative judgment that clearly runs afoul of antidiscrimination law.3 Case 2B might well seem equally troublesome. But in
fact it is not at all clear that Smith would be able to prevail in case 2B, at
least if there is no general pattern of race-based decisionmaking by the employer. Smith will face a burden of proof that will be hard to surmount on
the facts as stated.4 And note that these conclusions apply even if the employer is (parallel to cases 1A and 1B) a government rather than a private
actor; the administrative law and antidiscrimination law regimes treat "gut
feelings" in quite different ways.
Case 2B is far from unrealistic in today's world, as the present
Symposium makes clear. A growing body of evidence, summarized by
Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger,5 suggests that the real
world is probably full of such cases of "implicit," or unconscious, bias.

1. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
3. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Casefor NumericalStandards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1623 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias
Approach to DiscriminationandEqual Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995).
5. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV.945, 955-56 (2006).
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This is likely to be true not only with respect to race, but also with respect
to many other traits.6
Much evidence of these forms of implicit bias comes from the
Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has been taken by large and diverse
populations on the Internet and elsewhere.7 The IAT asks individuals to
perform the seemingly straightforward task of categorizing a series of
words or pictures into groups. Two of the groups are racial or other categories, such as "black" and "white," and two of the groups are the categories
"pleasant" and "unpleasant." In the version of the IAT designed to test for
implicit racial bias, respondents are asked to press one key on the computer
for either "black" or "unpleasant" words or pictures and a different key for
either "white" or "pleasant" words or pictures (a stereotype-consistent pairing); in a separate round of the test, respondents are asked to press one key
on the computer for either "black" or "pleasant" words or pictures and a
different key for either "white" or "unpleasant" words or pictures (a stereotype-inconsistent pairing). Implicit bias against African-Americans is defined as faster responses when the "black" and "unpleasant" categories are
paired than when the "black" and "pleasant" categories are paired. The
IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it easier to
associate pleasant words with white faces and names than with AfricanAmerican faces and names-and that the same pattern will be found for
other traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In fact, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be extremely widespread. Most people tend to prefer white to AfricanAmerican, young to old, and heterosexual to gay.8 Strikingly, members of
traditionally disadvantaged groups tend to show the same set of preferences. The only major exception is that African-Americans themselves are
divided in their preferences; about equal proportions show an implicit preference for African-Americans and whites.9 Note, however, that unlike
whites, African-Americans taken as a whole do not show an implicit preference for members of their own group."0
It might not be so disturbing to find implicit bias in experimental settings if the results did not predict actual behavior, and in fact the
relationship between IAT scores and behavior remains an active area of

6. See id. at 957-58.
7. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. Schwartz, Measuring
IndividualDifferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY,
RESEARCH, & PRACTICE 101 (2002).

8. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5, at 955-58; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra
note 7, at 1474; Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 7, at 105.
9. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5, at 956.
10. See id. at 956, 959-60.
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research." But we know enough to know that some of the time, those who
demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in various forms of actual
behavior. For example, there is strong evidence that scores on the IAT and
similar tests are correlated with third parties' ratings of the degree of general friendliness individuals show to members of another race.' 2 More particularly, "larger IAT effect scores predicted greater speaking time, more
smiling, [and] more extemporaneous social comments" in interactions with
whites as compared to African-Americans. 3 And it is reasonable to speculate that such uneasy interactions are associated with biased behavior. In
the employment context in particular, even informal differences in treatment may have significant effects on employment outcomes, particularly in
today's fluid workplaces. 4 If this is so, then the importance to legal policy
is clear. If people are treated differently, and worse, because of their race
or another protected trait, then the principle of antidiscrimination has been
violated, even if the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather
5
than conscious bias.
It should not be controversial to suggest that in formulating and interpreting legal rules, legislatures and courts should pay close attention to the
best available evidence about people's actual behavior-an approach this
Symposium terms "behavioral realism."' 6 Indeed, the influence of economic analysis of law stems largely from its careful emphasis on the behavioral effects of legal rules. The need to attend to good evidence, applied
to the domain of civil rights, animates the work in this Symposium. In
much the same spirit, work in behavioral law and economics has argued in
favor of incorporating psychological insights about people's actual

It. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Kristal Raymond, Lisa 1.
Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Presence of Implicit Bias in Physicians and its Prediction of
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious
Bias Affect Trial Judges? (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
12. See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and Explicit Prejudice
and InterracialInteraction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 66 (2002); Allen R. McConnell
& Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, DiscriminatoryBehavior, and
Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 439-40 (2001).
13.
McConnell & Leibold, supra note 12, at 439.
14. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99-108 (2003).
15.
The relationship between measures of implicit bias and people's actual behavior is discussed
further in R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discriminationand Implicit Bias in a
Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1187-89 (2006); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note
5, at 953-55; and Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action ",94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072-75 (2006).
16. For an in-depth discussion of "behavioral realism," see Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
Fiske, BehavioralRealism in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 997-1026 (2006).
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behavior across a range of domains.17 We believe that there are productive
links among all behavioral approaches to law, and one of the goals of our
discussion below is to call attention to some of those links. We devote special attention to the promise of "debiasing" actors through legal strategies
that are designed to counteract biases of various sorts across a variety of
domains.
Our discussion below comes in three parts. Part I explores two systems of cognitive operations-roughly, "intuitive" and "deliberative"with the suggestion that the distinction between the two helps to illuminate
legal responses to a wide range of behavioral problems, including those
raised by the IAT. Part II investigates the possibility of using the law to
"debias" people in order to reduce implicit bias; we develop several illustrations of such debiasing, as well as relating the general approach of debiasing both to work that follows in this Symposium and to work elsewhere
in the legal literature. Part III investigates some of the normative issues
that are raised when regulators attempt to respond, through "debiasing" or
otherwise, to implicit bias.
I
II
Implicit bias of the sort manifested on the IAT has not generally been
grouped with the "heuristics and biases" uncovered by research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. 8 Thus far, the reception within
law of the two areas of research has been largely independent. But we believe that legal responses to implicit bias are illuminatingly analyzed in
terms that bring such bias in direct contact with cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics. Most important, implicit bias-like many of the
heuristics and biases emphasized elsewhere-tends to have an automatic
character, in a way that bears importantly on its relationship to legal prohibitions.
In cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, much attention
has been devoted to heuristics, which are mental shortcuts or rules of
thumb that function well in many settings but lead to systematic errors in
SYSTEM

I AND

SYSTEM

17. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1051 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and CautiousSupporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).

18.

On heuristics and biases, see generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES];

INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT

UNDER

[hereinafter

JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].

UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS

AND

BIASES

(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
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others.' 9 Consider, for instance, the well-known study involving people's
judgments about a thirty-one-year-old woman, Linda, who was concerned
with issues of social justice and discrimination in college. People tend to
say that Linda was more likely to be a "feminist bank teller" than to be a
"bank teller."2 This judgment is patently illogical, for a superset cannot be
smaller than a set within it. The source of the mistake is the representativeness heuristic, by which events are seen to be more likely if they "look
like" certain causes.2 In the case of Linda, the use of the representativeness heuristic leads to a mistake of elementary logic-the conclusion that
characteristics X and Y are more likely to be present than characteristic X.
Research in cognitive psychology emphasizes that heuristics of this
kind frequently work through a process of "attribute substitution," in which
people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one.22 For instance,
people might resolve a question of probability not by investigating statistics, but by asking whether a relevant incident comes easily to mind.23 The
same process is familiar in many contexts. Confronted with a difficult
problem in constitutional law, people might respond by asking about the
views of trusted specialists-as, for example, through the use of (say) the
"Justice Scalia heuristic," by which some people might answer the difficult
problem by following the views of Justice Scalia.
Often, of course, people deliberately choose to use a heuristic, believing that it will enable them to reach accurate results. But some of the most
important heuristics have been connected to "dual process" approaches,
which have recently received considerable attention in the psychology literature.24 According to such approaches, people employ two cognitive systems. System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System II is more
deliberative, calculative, slower, and often more likely to be error-free.
Much heuristic-based thinking is rooted in System I, but it may be overridden, under certain conditions, by System 11.26 Thus, for example, some
people might make a rapid, intuitive judgment that a large German shepherd is likely to be vicious, but this judgment might be overcome after the
dog's owner assures them that the dog is actually quite friendly. Most

19. For general discussion of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick,
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 18, at 49-50.
20. See id. at 62 (discussing the study).
21.
See id. at 49-50.
22. See id. at 53.
23. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor Judging Frequencyand
Probability,5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973).
24.
See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov
Trope eds., 1999).

25.
A qualification is that a bad deliberative process might, of course, produce more errors than
rapid intuitions.
26. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 19, at 51.
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people would be reluctant to drink from a glass recently occupied by a
cockroach; but it is possible (though far from certain) that they would be
willing to do so after considering a reliable assurance that, because the
cockroach had been sterilized by heat, the glass was not contaminated." In
a context of greater relevance to law, heuristic-driven fears about eating
cloned animals or genetically modified food might be overcome on the
basis of careful studies suggesting that the risk of harm is quite low. 8
Judgments about potentially harmful events are often founded in System
I,9 and System II sometimes supplies a corrective. In other cases, however,
responses within the System I domain itself may supply correctives, as discussed at some length in Parts II and III below.
We believe that the problem of implicit bias is best understood in light
of existing analyses of System I processes. Implicit bias is largely automatic; the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation)
operates so quickly, in the relevant tests, that people have no time to deliberate. It is for this reason that people are often surprised to find that they
show implicit bias. Indeed, many people say in good faith that they are
fully committed to an antidiscrimination principle with respect to the very
trait against which they show a bias.30 When people exhibit bias toward
African-Americans, System II may of course be involved, as in case 2A
above, but in a great many cases System I is the culprit. In case 2B above,
the employer has no conscious awareness of the role race played in its decision to hire Jones over Smith; in fact, the employer might regard its decision as a "mistake," either factually or morally, if it were aware of the role
race played.
In responding to implicit bias understood in this way, the legal system
could emphasize System II; perhaps the law could produce or encourage a
System II override of the System I impulse. But it is also possible that interventions within the domain of System I itself would be more efficacious-although also more normatively charged. We explore these
possibilities in the next two Parts. 3'
27.
RISK,

See Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspectivesfrom the Study of Contagion, in
MEDIA,

AND

STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING

PUBLIC CHALLENGES

TO MODERN

SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY 31, 32 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001).

28.

See id.

29.

See, e.g., JOSEPH LEDOUx, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF

EMOTIONAL LIFE 138-78 (1996).
See, e.g., Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1474-75.
30.
31.
The legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous. Recent work emphasizing the IAT
in particular includes IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND

GENDER DISCRIMINATION 419-25 (2001); Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights
Violations When the Defendant is Not an Intentional Perpetrator:The Problems of Unconscious
DisparateTreatment and Unjustified DisparateImpacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225, 238-40
(2003); Mary Anne Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being DiscriminatedAgainst, 55 STAN L. REV.
2273, 2290-91 (2003) (book review); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial
Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1542-56 (2004); Blake D. Morant, The
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H1
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND "DEBIASING"

From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid differential
treatment based on race and other protected traits, implicit bias presents
obvious difficulties. In many cases entirely unaware of their bias and how
it shapes their behavior, people will frequently fail to override their System
I inclinations. Ordinary antidiscrimination law will often face grave difficulties in ferreting out implicit bias even when this bias produces unequal
treatment.32
Of course, antidiscrimination law has long forbidden various forms of
differential treatment on the basis of race and other protected traits. If, for
example, a state official treats someone worse because of race, there might
well be a violation of the Constitution as well as antidiscrimination statutes. Some of the hardest cases present problems of proof: if there is no
"smoking gun," how can bias be established? There are also vexing conceptual questions-explored below by Richard Banks, Jennifer Eberhardt,
and

Lee

Ross.33

What,

exactly,

does

the

category

of unlawful

include?34

"discrimination"
However the hardest questions are resolved, it
seems clear that when System I is producing differential treatment, the legal system will often encounter unusually serious difficulties.
The parallels described above between implicit bias and the heuristics
and biases emphasized by cognitive psychology and behavioral economics
help to illuminate the primary approaches the law can adopt in response to
unequal treatment stemming from implicit bias. In the domain of heuristics
and biases, the law has now-familiar methods with which to respond.35 In
the context of "hindsight bias," for example, the law protects against error
by broadly restricting adjudicators' ability to reconsider decisions from the

Relevance of Gender Bias Studies, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1080 n.35 (2001); Lateef Mtima,
The Road to the Bench: Not Even Good (Subliminal) Intentions, 8 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 135,
155-58 (2001); Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 459, 489-91 (2003); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical
Analysis: The Case for a QualifiedEvidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege,74 WASH. L.
REV. 913, 959-64 (1999); Evan R. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1051
n.144 (2002); Michael S. Shin, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial
Disparitiesin Medical Care,90 CALIF. L. REV. 2047, 2066-68 (2002); Megan Sullaway, Psychological
Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 250, 256 (2004); Joan C. Williams,
The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender DiscriminationCases
and Defang the "Cluelessness "Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 401, 446-47 (2003).
32.
See sources cited infra note 45.
33.
See Banks, Eberhardt & Ross, supra note 15, at 1178-89.
34.
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935 (1989).
35.
See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,

199-201 (2006).
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perspective of hindsight.3 6 Likewise, in the area of consumer behavior,
many people believe that consumers show unrealistic optimism in evaluating potential product dangers, and the law may respond by imposing a
range of restrictions on their choices.37 These approaches attempt to insulate outcomes from the problems created by heuristics and biases, which
themselves are taken as a given. Such insulating strategies are readily
imaginable in the antidiscrimination law domain, as explored in Part II.A
below.
Social scientists have also focused substantial attention on the possibility of debiasing in response to heuristics and biases.38 The law might
engage in such debiasing as well, seeking to reduce people's level of bias
rather than to insulate outcomes from its effects.39 If, for instance, consumers suffer from unrealistic optimism, then regulators might respond not by
banning certain transactions or otherwise restricting consumer choice but
instead by working directly on the underlying mistake.4" They might, for
example, enlist the availability heuristic, according to which people estimate the likelihood of events based on how easily they can imagine or recall examples of such events. Drawing on availability, regulators might
then offer concrete examples of harm in order to help consumers understand risks more accurately. In the domain of smoking, an emphasis on
specific instances of harm does appear to increase people's estimates of the
likelihood of harm. 41 Attention to strategies for what we have elsewhere
termed "debiasing through law" can help both to understand and to improve the legal system. 42 Note that many of these strategies-including the
example just given of harnessing the availability heuristic-reflect System
I rather than System II responses to System I problems. Debiasing strategies may also be applied in the domain of antidiscrimination law. We offer
a series of illustrations-as well as relating the general approach of debiasing to work in this Symposium and elsewhere in the legal literature-in
Parts II.B. and II.C below.
A.

Insulation

When people show bias on the basis of race or another protected trait,
the most conventional legal response is to attempt to insulate outcomes
36.

See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.

CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).

37. See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 207-08.
38. The seminal work is Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supranote 18, at 422.
39. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 200-01.
40. See id. at 209-16.
41.

See FRANK A.

SLOAN, V.

KERRY

SMITH &

DONALD H. TAYLOR,

PUZZLE: INFORMATION, RISK PERCEPTION, AND CHOICE 157-79

42.

(2003).

See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 202, 206-24.
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from the effects of such bias. Because, for instance, certain forms of employment behavior are unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,43 people will face monetary and other liability for engaging in such
behavior. The desire to avoid such liability should, on the traditional view,
deter the prohibited behavior. The point is particularly obvious with respect to consciously biased behavior of the sort at issue in case 2A above.
There is no question that such behavior is squarely prohibited by antidiscrimination law, and-because the behavior is conscious-actors can be
expected to respond to legal incentives not to engage in it, at least if people
care enough about complying with the law (or at least if the penalties are
stiff enough for those who are deterred only by actual sanctions). With respect to conscious bias, existing law attempts not to "debias" people-by
reducing their conscious bias on the basis of race or another protected trait
(although this may be a longer-term effect of the law)-but to insulate outcomes from the effects of such bias.'
A central problem in today's world, however, is the possibility that
many people act on the basis of implicit bias. In response, legal rules might
seek to reduce the likelihood that implicit bias will produce differential
outcomes; but it would be quite difficult to conclude that current antidiscrimination law adequately achieves this goal.45 As Linda Hamilton
43. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e17 (2000).
44. Linda Hamilton Krieger nicely summarizes this effect of existing antidiscrimination law:
[On the traditional view], if an employee's protected group status is playing a role in an
employer's decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of that role ....Equipped
with conscious self-awareness, well-intentioned employers become capable of complying
with the law's proscriptive injunction not to discriminate. They will monitor their
decisionmaking processes and prevent prohibited factors from affecting their judgments.
Krieger, supra note 4, at 1167.
45. The scholarly literature critiquing existing antidiscrimination law, both constitutional and
statutory, for its general failure to address the problem of implicit bias is voluminous. See, e.g., Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3
(2006) ("Unconscious bias, interacting with today's 'boundaryless workplace,' generates inequalities
that our current antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to solve.") (citation omitted); Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE
L.J. 2009, 2018-30 (1995) (concluding that existing employment discrimination law would not provide
relief for an employee who was disadvantaged by the implicit use of criteria that are more strongly
associated with whites than nonwhites); Barbara J.Flagg, "'Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958 (1993)
(stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine "perfectly reflects" whites' failure to "scrutinize
the whiteness of facially neutral norms") [hereinafter Flagg, White Race Consciousness]; Green, supra
note 14, at Ill ("[E]xisting Title VII doctrine.., is ill-equipped to address the forms of discrimination
that derive from organizational structure and institutional practice in the modem workplace."); Krieger,
supra note 4, at 1164 (arguing that the way in which employment discrimination law "constructs
discrimination, while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is
inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias" prevalent today); Charles R.
Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (stating that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine "ignores much of what
we understand about how the human mind works" and "disregards... the profound effect that the
history of American race relations has had on the individual and collective unconscious"); R.A.
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Krieger and Susan Fiske illustrate in their contribution to this Symposium,
recent trends in antidiscrimination law seem to leave much implicitly biased behavior unpoliced in the employment context.46 Krieger and Fiske
suggest, for instance, that most courts have now made explicit that any facially neutral basis for an employer's decision will, if honestly although
mistakenly or foolishly held, suffice to defeat a claim of intentional discrimination under Title VII. 47 As Krieger and Fiske powerfully demonstrate, an "honest" concern about an employee may very often be both
"honest" and (unbeknownst to the decisionmaker) entirely a product of the
employee's status as an African-American worker.48
It is important not to overstate the point. In discrete corners of existing antidiscrimination law and policy, it is possible to find promising attempts to insulate outcomes from the effects of implicit bias. Consider, for
example, the affirmative action plans seen at all levels of government.49
Such plans can illuminatingly be understood-in light of the analysis of
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji in this Symposium'°--as attempts by the
state to correct for implicit bias, and thus to break the connection between
such bias and outcomes. 5 If assessments of merit are inappropriately
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803,
878 (2004) (recognizing the "limitations inherent in the Supreme Court's current approach to racial
stigma" under the Equal Protection Clause); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1830-43 (2000) (describing
the gap between subtle forms of discriminatory conduct and current Equal Protection Clause doctrine);
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 972 (1993) (stating
that while "much employment discrimination" results from unintentional behavior, "the courts have
looked at employment discrimination as a problem of conscious, intentional wrong-doing"); Antony
Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV.
155, 179-80 (2005) (arguing that existing Equal Protection Clause doctrine in the context of
peremptory challenges to jurors fails to respond in an effective manner to implicitly biased behavior);
Poirier, supra note 31, at 459-63 (criticizing, in light of evidence of implicitly biased behavior, the
focus of employment discrimination law on various forms of intentional misconduct); Reshma M.
Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test ": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative DecisionMaking, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 413 (2003) (asserting that existing Equal Protection Clause
doctrine is "incapable of rooting out racial discrimination where it is most pernicious"); Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (1997) (stating that "the empirical literature on racial bias" suggests that
"most race-dependent governmental decisionmaking will elude equal protection scrutiny"). For further
discussion of many of these critiques, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law's Effects on Implicit
Bias, in BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION (Mitu Gulati & Michael Yelnosky
eds., forthcoming 2006).
46. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 16, at 1027-52.
47. See id. at 1034-36.
48. See id. at 1036-38.
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 334 (2003).
50. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 1066, 1082-90.
51.
Ann McGinley and Michael Selmi have also discussed the problem of implicit bias and noted
that affirmative action is a way to ensure that employment opportunities of protected groups do not
suffer as a result of such bias. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative
Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision
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clouded by implicit bias, then a preference for those harmed by the biased
assessments can help prevent the implicit bias from being translated into
final outcomes. 2 If implicit bias typically leads an African-American employee to be incorrectly evaluated as worse than a white counterpart, an
appropriately tailored affirmative action plan can counteract this mistake.
And, likewise, antidiscrimination law's framework for assessing the legality of affirmative action plans5 3 can be understood as enabling employers,
educational institutions, and other organizations to use such plans to break
the connection between implicit bias and outcomes.
B. "DirectDebiasing"
In addition to the "insulating" strategies discussed in Part II.A, it is
often possible for government to target implicit bias more directly. If decisionmakers, wholly without their intent and indeed to their great chagrin,
are acting on the basis of race or another protected trait, the law may be
able to help them to correct their unintended actions. Debiasing solutions
reflect this approach, and we now turn to those solutions. Below we develop several illustrations of debiasing through antidiscrimination law, as
well as relating the general approach of debiasing through this body of law
to work by others in this Symposium and elsewhere in the legal literature.
In the most obvious form of debiasing, antidiscrimination law or policy either does or could act directly to reduce the level of people's implicit
bias. Consider four examples of such "direct debiasing."
1. ProhibitingConsciously Biased Decisionmaking
The central focus of existing antidiscrimination law is on prohibiting
consciously biased decisionmaking-a focus that has produced intense
criticism from those interested in implicit bias. 4 Thus, it is easy to overlook the way in which existing antidiscrimination law, despite its focus on
conscious bias, nonetheless has some effect on the level of implicit bias. A
key causal path here is that the prohibition on consciously biased decisionmaking in workplaces, educational institutions, and membership organizations naturally tends to increase population diversity in these
entities, and population diversity in turn has a significant effect on the level
of implicit bias. 5 Put differently, while the prohibition on consciously
Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1044-46, 1048-49 (1997); Michael Selmi, Testing for
Equality:Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1284-89, 1297

(1995).
52.
Kang and Banaji, however, ultimately limit their discussion to specific forms of (what is
conventionally regarded as) affirmative action. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 1067.
53. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-42 (framework under Title VIl); Grutter,539 U.S. at 32243 (framework under the Constitution).
54.
55.

See sources cited supra note 45.
See Jolls, supra note 45.
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biased behavior prompts a System II response to the System II phenomenon of conscious bias, it also yields a System I response to the System I
phenomenon of implicit bias.
A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclusion
that the presence of population diversity in an environment tends to reduce
the level of implicit bias.16 In one particularly striking study, the simple
fact of administration of an in-person IAT by an African-American rather
than a white experimenter significantly reduced the measured level of implicit bias.57 Put differently, people's speed in characterizing blackunpleasant and white-pleasant pairs was closer to their speed in characterizing black-pleasant and white-unpleasant pairs when the AfricanAmerican experimenter was present. Another study found that white test
subjects paired with an African-American partner exhibited less implicit
bias as measured by the IAT than white test subjects paired with a white
partner; the same study found that within pairs involving an AfricanAmerican partner, participants who were told they were to evaluate the
African-American partner exhibited more implicit racial bias on the IAT
than participants who were told they would be evaluated by the AfricanAmerican partner.58
The effects of population diversity in the environment on the level of
implicit bias may stem from the availability heuristic discussed in Part I;
people often tend to assess probabilities based on whether a relevant incidence comes easily to mind. The effects of diversity may also reflect a
more general role for the "affect heuristic," by which decisions are formed
by reference to rapid, intuitive, affective judgments.59
It follows from these findings that simply by increasing the level of
population diversity in workplaces, educational institutions, and other organizations, existing antidiscrimination law tends to reduce the level of
implicit bias in these environments.6 ° It bears emphasis in this connection
that antidiscrimination law's clear rejection of explicit quotas counters the
risk that this law might paradoxically increase implicit bias by means of

56. Leading studies include Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure
to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 642, 649-50, 651-52 (2004); Brian S. Lowery,
Curtis D. Hardin & Stacey Sinclair, Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 844-45, 846-47 (2001); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady,
Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177,
179-81 (2003). Kang and Banaji provide additional discussion of supportive evidence, including a
recent meta-study by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 110205.
57. See Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, supra note 56, at 844-45, 846-47.
58. See Richeson & Ambady, supra note 56, at 181, table 1.
59. See Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect
Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 18, at 397, 397-400.
60. See Jolls, supra note 45.
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overly heavy-handed diversity initiatives. 6' A closely related point is important: existing antidiscrimination law's effects on implicit bias through
increased population diversity may be greatest in cases in which people's
initial levels of implicit bias represent errors in judgment as opposed to
statistically accurate perceptions. As discussed in Part I above, implicit
bias, like the heuristics and biases emphasized in cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics, may often reflect a genuine factual error; but of
course this may not always be the case. If implicit bias corresponds to statistically accurate perceptions about the group in question, then the effects
of population diversity may be muted by conflicting signals corresponding
to the statistical reality.
2. ProhibitingHostile Environments
Existing antidiscrimination law's prohibition on "hostile environments" is also likely to reduce the level of implicit bias in workplaces, educational institutions, and other organizations, here through its effect on the
physical and sensory environment.62 Again, what is generally viewed as a
System II response to a System II problem is also a System I response to a
System I problem.
Both evidence and common sense suggest that the presence of stereotypic images of a particular group tends to increase implicit bias.63 A particularly striking study, outside the direct context of measures of implicit
bias, found that men who had viewed a pornographic film just before being
interviewed by a woman remembered little about the interviewer other than
her physical characteristics-while men who had watched a regular film
before the interview had meaningful recall of the content of the interview.'
Mechanisms such as the availability and affect heuristics may again be in
65
play.
61.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000) ("Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be
interpreted to require any employer... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer... in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area .... "). For discussion of the ways in which some types of explicit preferential treatment of
particular groups can increase bias against these groups, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika:Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1263-70 (1998).
62.
See Jolls, supra note 45.
63.
See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away:
The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

828, 832-33 (2001).
64. See Doug McKenzie-Mohr & Mark P. Zanna, Treating Women as Sexual Objects: Look to
the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has Viewed Pornography, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 296, 303-04 (1990), discussed in Jolls, supra note 45.
65.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Under current antidiscrimination law, hostile environments featuring
negative or demeaning depictions of protected groups (including, but not
limited to, depictions in posters and other visual media) are generally
unlawful in workplaces, educational institutions, and membership organizations.6 6 In this way, current law governing sexual and racial harassment
almost certainly produces some effect on the level of implicit bias in these
institutions. 67 Compared to an environment in which such demeaning depictions were not unlawful, the current framework is likely to have a debiasing effect.
The prohibition on hostile environments may be felt throughout the
organization, not merely by those directly targeted by the behavior. The
law does not simply protect an immediate victim or set of victims from
behavior deemed to be unlawful; instead the law tends to shape and affect
the level of implicit bias of all those present. Of course, the law does not
target people's beliefs as such; the point is that in proscribing certain conduct it undoubtedly has an effect on the level of implicit bias.68
3.

The Requirementsfor Employers Seeking to Avoid Vicarious Liability

A third example of a direct debiasing mechanism involves potential
reforms of the existing doctrine governing employers' vicarious liability
for Title VII violations. At present that doctrine allows employers to defend against such liability on the basis of actions such as policy manuals or
training videos disseminated in the workplace.69
Just as there are biasing effects (described just above) from negative
imagery in the physical environment, there is strong evidence of debiasing
effects from favorable portraiture or imagery-for instance, photographs of
Tiger Woods-in the physical environment.70 People show significantly
less bias on the IAT directly after being exposed to Woods's picture-and
also when tested again twenty-four hours after exposure to the picture.7"
Thus, in the real world, if portraiture in the workplace or elsewhere consistently reflects positive exemplars, it is likely-though certainly not

66. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (addressing workplace environment
under Title VII); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (addressing school
environment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); MINN. STAT. §363A.1 I subd. 1
(2004) (addressing voluntary organization environment under state law); Jolls, supra note 45 (citing
and discussing cases, including the renowned Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. case, involving
visual media specifically).
67. See Jolls, supra note 45.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-09 (1998).
70. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-04 (2001).
71.
See id.
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guaranteed 72-- that those present will show less implicit bias, with likely
mechanisms once more being the availability and affect heuristics.73
Note that in contrast to the experimental setting, positive exemplars in
the workplace or elsewhere would be a recurrent rather than fleeting aspect
of the individual's environment. And, parallel to the point above, the manner in which the display of positive exemplars occurs is important; if it is
too heavy-handed, implicit bias may not decrease at all (and could even
increase).74
In light of the available evidence, it may make a good deal of sense to
treat an employer's positive effort to portray diversity as an express factor
weighing against vicarious employer liability under Title VII. This approach would be parallel to the way that, under current Title VII doctrine,
employers regularly defend against such liability on the basis of actions
such as manuals or training videos disseminated in the workplace.75 Our
basic suggestion is that the existing Title VII approach to employers' vicarious liability might be extended beyond the discrete mechanisms
(manuals, handbooks, videos, internet instructional programs) contemplated by present law-at least if doing so is consistent with the First
Amendment (a question beyond the scope of the present discussion). While
many of the mechanisms contemplated by present law governing vicarious
liability are distinctly System II in character, the evidence suggests the important role of System I mechanisms in reducing implicit bias. The display
of positive exemplars in the workplace may do far more to reduce implicit
bias than yet another mandatory training session on workplace diversity.
4. Affirmative Action Policy
Existing affirmative action policy can also be understood as a form of
direct debiasing. We have already noted that at all levels of government,
officials have chosen to adopt affirmative action plans.76 Because population diversity helps to reduce implicit bias through mechanisms including
availability and affect (as described above), these government affirmative
action plans may operate as a form of direct debiasing.77
To be sure, government affirmative action may fail to debias peopleand might even increase implicit bias depending on a given plan's specific
contours. Krieger, while noting how affirmative action may reduce bias,78
See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 5, at 964 (raising caution about longer term effects of
72.
positive imagery).
See supranote 59 and accompanying text.
73.
74.
See supranote 61 and accompanying text.
75.
See sources cited supranote 69.
76. See supranote 49 and accompanying text.
See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law (Nov. 18, 2003)
77.
(unpublished manuscript, Yale Legal Theory workshop, on file with authors).
78. See Krieger, supra note 61, at 1275-76.
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has explored the possible negative effects of affirmative action on the level
of bias with reference to the existing social science literature,79 and the
question of whether and when such negative effects will occur is obviously
a crucial one. From the standpoint of reducing implicit bias, the good news
is that the empirical studies discussed above highlight the potential of increased diversity to reduce implicit bias, while the evidence discussed by
Krieger provides many insights on the specific types of affirmative action
plans that do and do not appear to have negative effects on the level of
bias.8"
Our analysis of affirmative action here differs from the insulating
analysis of affirmative action discussed in Part II.A above. In the conception here, government affirmative action does not act to insulate outcomes
from the effects of implicit bias but, instead, acts directly to reduce such
bias.81 Of course, a government affirmative action plan may have both
types of effects simultaneously.
Let us offer a concluding comment about all of the methods of direct
debiasing explored in this section. Uniting all of these methods is the general idea that government does or might act against implicit bias using
System I rather than System II mechanisms. The direct debiasing approaches described here thus mark a substantial departure from alternative
efforts focused on "deliberate 'mental correction' that takes group status
squarely into account."8 2 We discuss normative issues arising out of this
System I-System II difference in Part III below.
C.

"IndirectDebiasing"

We now turn to mechanisms for what we call "indirect debiasing"mechanisms that receive sustained and insightful treatment in this
Symposium in the work by Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske and
the work by Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji5 3 Under indirect debiasing
mechanisms, law prohibits or permits certain behavior and, as an indirect
result of the prohibition or permission, creates incentives (or avoids disincentives) for regulated actors to adopt a debiasing approach. Indirect
79. See id. at 1263-70.
80. See id.
81.
Analyses of affirmative action and implicit bias in the existing legal literature have often not
been specific about which sort of mechanisn--"insulating" or "debiasing" in our terms-produces the
effect of an affirmative action plan; both mechanisms may be contemplated. See, e.g., Michael J.
Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 1385 (2003); cf
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 7,
26-29, 77-94 (2000) (discussing how population diversity from affirmative action may reduce various
forms of bias including conscious bias, but expressing pessimism about the possibility of altering
implicit bias).
82.
83.

See Krieger, supra note 61, at 1279.
See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 16, at 1056-61; Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 1111-15.
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measures differ from direct measures in that it is no longer necessarily the
case that in conforming to the specific dictates of law or policy, an actor
will take steps that tend to reduce implicit bias. We consider two examples
of indirect debiasing mechanisms below.
1.

A Prohibitionon Implicitly Biased Behavior

Many scholars suggest that existing antidiscrimination law does little
to police implicitly biased behavior.8 4 A variety of proposed reforms, including those proposed by Krieger and Fiske in this Symposium, would
broaden the reach of antidiscrimination law in addressing that behavior."
It is obvious that if antidiscrimination law were to proscribe implicitly
biased behavior in an effective manner, the law would encourage employers to adopt mechanisms to reduce implicit bias. (Obviously, the greater
the translation of implicit bias to implicitly biased behavior, the greater the
incentive for employers.) Following the discussion above, such mechanisms could include population diversity in the organization (Parts II.B. 1
and II.B.4) and careful attention to depictions of protected groups in the
physical environment (Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3). The discussion above described how those steps tend to reduce the level of implicit bias.
Alternatively, effective prohibition of implicitly biased behavior could
encourage employers to adopt general decisionmaking structures or processes that reduce the intensity and frequency of implicit bias, implicitly
biased behavior, or both. In the words of one commentator, steps may include "creating interdependence among in-group and out-group members,
providing structure and guidance for appraisal and evaluation, and making
decisionmnakers accountable for their decisions."86 It is unclear whether the
mechanisms in play here will be predominantly System I or System II in
nature. In a related vein, Susan Sturm has recounted how major accounting
firm offices came to recognize and address sex-based disparities in assignments through the simple step of having the office managing partners
list the nature and quantity of assignments to employees by sex.87 (They
were very surprised by the simple fact that there were significant disparities in assignments by sex.)
It is reasonable to suppose that steps such as these would reduce the
underlying level of implicit bias as well as implicitly biased behavior; if so,
then the law's inducement of employers to adopt such steps is an
84. See sources cited supra note 45.
85. See, e.g., Flagg, White Race Consciousness, supra note 45, at 991-1017; Krieger, supra note
4, at 1186-1217, 1241-44; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 16, at 1056-61; Lawrence, supra note 45, at
355-81; Poirier, supra note 31, at 478-91; Saujani, supra note 45, at 413-18.
86. Green, supra note 14, at 147. Green also notes, consistent with the previous paragraph, that
employers might seek to construct "heterogeneous work and decisionmaking groups." See id.
87. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 496 (2001).
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illustration of indirect debiasing. But such steps may in some cases simply
insulate outcomes from the effects of an underlying level of implicit bias,
in which case they are insulating rather than debiasing approaches within
our framework.
We do not take a position here on the relative effectiveness of the
many diverse means by which decisionmakers might seek to reduce implicit bias, implicitly biased behavior, or both in response to effective prohibition of implicitly biased behavior. It is uncertain whether approaches
centered in System II would do much to reduce the phenomena; so too the
potential limits on some of the System I approaches were explored in Part
II.B above. Here we simply highlight the likelihood that much-discussed
reform efforts with respect to policing implicitly biased behavior would
produce responses that, in turn, would tend to reduce the level of implicit
bias.
2. The Legal Treatment ofAffirmative Action Plans
A second example of an indirect debiasing mechanism is the legal
treatment of affirmative action plans. We have emphasized that government might engage in direct debiasing through the adoption of such plans.
It follows that in tolerating such plans (whether imposed by public or by
private actors), the law is engaging in a form of indirect debiasing; that is,
regulated actors are permitted to take steps that, in turn, tend to reduce implicit bias.
Kang and Banaji argue in this Symposium that a proper interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII would allow employers to
engage in affirmative action in order to produce a diverse workforce and
thereby reduce implicit bias.88 Importantly, Kang and Banaji explain that
these forms of affirmative action are distinct from the "role model" arguments that have met with very mixed reception in the courts; in the debiasing approach, the emphasis is on the attitudes and behavior of those
outside, rather than within, the traditionally underrepresented group.89
To clarify, the emphasis in the present discussion is on creating legal
structures within which actors may choose to adopt debiasing mechanisms;
by contrast, our discussion in Part II.B.4 above involved the affirmative
choice by the state to adopt such mechanisms itself. In our terminology, the
state engages in direct debiasing when it chooses to adopt an affirmative
action plan that directly reduces implicit bias. By contrast, the state can be
said to engage in indirect debiasing when it enables actors (including government itself) to adopt such affirmative action plans. In one case, the legal
88.
policy in
diversity,
89.

See Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 1111-15. For an initial discussion of the idea that legal
the form of government affirmative action reduces implicit bias through increased population
see Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 76.
See Kang & Banaji, supra note 15, at 1110.
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policy itself debiases, while in the other case the legal policy provides a
space in which regulated actors may adopt debiasing mechanisms. Of
course, insofar as government affirmative action plans are concerned, both
types of debiasing will be in play.
D. Summary
In a variety of ways, existing law and policy seek to respond to the
problem of implicit bias; imaginable reforms could do far more. Some
strategies focus on insulating outcomes from the effects of implicit bias,
which itself is taken largely as a given. But many actual and imaginable
legal approaches instead act to reduce implicit bias. Such effects occur directly when the law requires steps that tend to reduce implicit bias (Part
II.B). They occur indirectly when the law encourages or enables regulated
actors to craft steps that, in turn, reduce implicit bias (Part II.C). Table I
provides a summary of these alternative approaches.
Note that while our focus throughout is on the law's role in debiasing
in response to implicit bias, private individuals may act, apart from law, in
an effort to debias themselves.9" Such steps represent nonlegal alternatives
to the problem of implicit bias. For purposes of legal scholarship, however,
the central question, and the question emphasized in Table 1, is the role of
law in combating implicit bias.

90.

See id. at 1108.

HeinOnline -- 94 Cal. L. Rev. 988 2006

THE LAW OFIMPLICIT BIAS

2006]

Table I.- Debiasingand Other Legal Responses to Implicit Bias
Type of Law

Insulating Mechanisms: Law orpolicy
insulates outcomes
from the effects of implicit bias

DirectDebiasing
Mechanisms: Specific
legal or policy dictates
directly reduce implicit
bias

IndirectDebiasing
Mechanisms: Law
encourages or enables
regulatedactors to
take steps that reduce
implicit bias

1) Existing government affirmative action
policies' overriding of
"merit" evaluations
that will tend to be implicitly biased (Part
ILA)

1) Existing antidiscrimination law's prohibition on consciously
biased behavior and
resulting positive effect
on workplace, educational, or other diversity

1) Existing antidiscrimination law's prohibition on implicitly
biased behavior (to
the extent such a prohibition exists) or extension of existing

(Part 11.B. 1)

antidiscrimination
law's prohibitions to
cover implicitly biased behavior (Part

II.C. 1)
2) Antidiscrimination
law's framework for
assessing the legality
of affirmative action
policies; these policies
may override "merit"
evaluations that will
tend
to (Part
be implicitly
biased
II.A)

2) Existing antidiscrimination law's prohibition on hostile
workplace, educational,
or other environments
(Part II.B.2)
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2) Antidiscrimination
law's framework for
assessing the legality
of affirmative action
policies; these policies
may encourage employers to adopt diversity-oriented hiring
practices that reduce
implicit bias (Part
II.C.2)
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Table I (cont.): Debiasingand Other Legal Responses to Implicit Bias
Type of Law
Insulating Mechanisms: Law orpolicy
insulates outcomes
from the effects of implicit bias

Direct Debiasing
Mechanisms: Specific
legal orpolicy dictates
directly reduce implicit
bias

Indirect Debiasing
Mechanisms: Law
encourages or enables
regulated actors to
take steps that reduce
implicit bias

3) Extension of existing
antidiscrimination law
to require employers
seeking to avoid vicarious liability to foster
diversity in the physical
environment (Part
II.B.3)
4) Existing state affirmative action policies' positive effect on
workplace, educational,
or other diversity (Part
II.B.4)

E.

Debiasingof Whom?

In the various debiasing interventions discussed above, the presumed
targets of the debiasing were actors at risk of displaying implicit bias or
implicitly biased behavior toward members of a protected group. But the
contribution of Gary Blasi and John Jost to this Symposium illustrates that
such behavior is only one part of a complete analysis. As Blasi and Jost
describe, those who are victims of implicitly biased behavior may often
accept and even justify, rather than object to, such behavior-a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of "system justification."9 1 In our view,
Blasi and Jost should be understood to be supplementing a great deal of
work that explores the general possibility of "adaptive preferences"preferences that have adapted to existing injustice.92

91. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implicationsfor
Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1136-37 (2006).
92. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983).
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In the employment context, for example, George Akerlof and Robert
Dickens argue that employees may fail to confront the real magnitude of
occupational risks, simply because it is so distressing to do so.93 Speaking
in broader terms, Amartya Sen has long emphasized that "deprived
people... may even adjust their desires and expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible."94 Describing the hierarchical nature of preRevolutionary America, historian Gordon Wood writes that those "in lowly
stations ... developed what was called a 'down look,'

and "knew their

place and willingly walked while gentlefolk rode; and as yet they seldom
expressed any burning desire to change places with their betters."9 5 In
Wood's account, it is impossible to "comprehend the distinctiveness of that
premodern world until we appreciate the extent to which many ordinary
people still accepted their own lowliness."96 If Blasi and Jost are right, then
the modem world is not entirely different from its premodern counterpart.
In addition to the general evidence that they muster, the results of the
IAT itself provide some support for system justification. As we noted
above, a significant number of African-Americans show the same implicit
racial bias on the IAT as whites.97
In this light, an important potential benefit of the debiasing approaches described above is that they may reduce levels of implicit bias in
victims as well as perpetrators of implicitly biased behavior. If, for example, population diversity reduces implicit bias among those presentwhatever their particular group-then such diversity should not only reduce implicitly biased behavior by perpetrators, but also increase resistance
to such behavior by victims. Likewise, if avoiding sexually explicit visual
displays in the workplace reduces levels of implicit sex stereotyping
among women as well as men, then avoiding such displays may affect
women's, as well as men's, behavior. Debiasing victims is undoubtedly a
massive issue for law and policy. Our suggestion here is that many efforts
to debias perpetrators help simultaneously to counteract the problem that
Blasi and Jost explore in this Symposium.
III
NORMATIVE QUESTIONS

The central emphasis of Part II was the way in which antidiscrimination law and policy either does or could act to reduce implicit bias. While
the analysis thus far has been purely descriptive, these sorts of debiasing
93.

See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive

Dissonance,72 AM. EcON. REV. 307 (1982).
94. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 63 (1999).
95.
GORDON S.WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

96.
97.

Id. at 30.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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strategies raise important normative questions. Consideration of those
questions turns out to be importantly assisted by the parallels from Part I
between implicit bias and the heuristics and biases emphasized in cognitive
psychology and behavioral economics.
A.

Thought Control?

No doubt the most obvious normative question raised by legal attempts to reduce people's implicit bias is whether such debiasing strategies
amount to objectionable government "thought control." Like the other contributors to this Symposium, we believe that implicit bias is a serious problem and that it is exceedingly important for the law to attempt to address
implicitly biased behavior. Often, as noted above, the most plausible responses to the problem of implicit bias will be legal steps that reduce such
bias. But any use of the law to this end raises immediate normative questions. Is it appropriate for government to seek to shape how people think
about their coworkers, fellow students, or other colleagues?
In many domains, some government control over what people think is
simply unavoidable. Illustrations from current law, outside of the antidiscrimination context, are easily imagined. Whenever the government is so
much as presenting information to people in response to factual misjudgments, government is making decisions about the manner of presentation,
and these choices inevitably will affect how its citizens perceive the world
around them.9 8 But in the domain of civil rights addressed in this
Symposium, it may be difficult to disentangle factual mistakes in judgment-where changing what people think is common and frequently unobjectionable in a wide range of domains 99-from genuine preferences and
values with which government may have no business engaging. While
government, on this view, may be entitled to discourage conduct based on
such preferences and values, it might well seem illegitimate for it to seek to
alter the preferences and values themselves.
We emphasize two main points here. First, it is plainly unobjectionable for government to act in response to factual errors; if people are simply mistaken as a matter of fact in associating a particular trait or attribute
with members of one race, attempts at government correction do not raise
especially profound issues. Information campaigns, either for risk regulation or for antidiscrimination law, are not objectionable in principle.'00
Public defenses of such campaigns may readily be made without affront to
the "publicity condition," under which government must be able to make

98.
99.
100.

See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 232.
See id.
For discussion in the context of risky consumer products, see id.
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full disclosure of its actions to the citizenry.' O' And, our discussion in Part I
suggested how implicit bias may sometimes be akin to a factual error. If
implicit bias leads people to make such errors in assessing others, then
government may legitimately seek to correct those errors.
Second, it is equally unobjectionable for government to ban biased
behavior-whether consciously biased or implicitly biased-even if one
effect of the ban is to alter people's values and preferences. Of course, this
suggestion does not mean that government may use the force of law to target beliefs rather than behavior-even if the beliefs are targeted as a way
of preventing behavior. Suppose, for example, that a workplace features
demeaning pictures and jokes that are likely to increase both implicit bias
and implicitly biased behavior against female employees or students.
Suppose then that regulators attempt to eliminate those pictures and jokes
because of their likely negative effects; perhaps regulators are aware that
relevant conditions will likely activate System I in a way that has concrete
effects on women in the workplace. It is not unreasonable to see a problem
with regulating speech (posters and jokes) on the ground that it is likely to
lead to biased behavior.
There is, however, another possibility, rooted most obviously in our
discussion of hostile environment liability in Part 11.13.2 above. In some
circumstances, workplace practices (such as posters and jokes) that are
likely to produce biased behavior are themselves independently a form of
unlawful discrimination. Suppose, for example, that demeaning pictures
and jokes are pervasive in a certain workplace, in a way that creates a hostile environment for women. As described above, the pictures and jokes are
then directly targeted as unlawful under existing antidiscrimination law. If
there were a compelling concern with government "thought control" under
this law, one would naturally expect successful challenges to it under the
First Amendment, but in fact the standard view is that the legal prohibition
here is consistent with First Amendment principles. °2 As this example illustrates, the law tolerates some government prohibitions on discriminatory
behavior, even when they relate directly to speech, despite their potential
effects on people's values and preferences.
We do not mean in this space to settle all of the dimensions of the
"thought control" objection to government efforts to reduce implicit bias.
But this much is clear. The normative problems are least severe when government is counteracting either factual mistakes or forms of discriminatory
behavior such as hostile work environments; and if efforts to combat such
101.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 23132.
102. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2304-06 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 1,21-51.

HeinOnline -- 94 Cal. L. Rev. 993 2006

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 94:969

forms of biased behavior also reduce implicit bias, no one should complain
in light of existing law.
One final point. Many people are both surprised and embarrassed to
find that they show implicit bias, and their bias conflicts with their explicit
judgments and their moral commitments." 3 As we have suggested, it is
likely to be the case that some people engage in biased behavior inadvertently or despite their own ideals. Such people want, in a sense, to be debiased, but their own conscious efforts are at most a partial help. Many
normative objections to debiasing strategies, as forms of objectionable
government meddling, are weakened to the extent that such strategies help
people to remove implicit bias that they themselves reject on principle.
B.

Heterogeneous Actors

Without more, the "thought control" concerns discussed above might,
for some, argue in favor of insulating over debiasing strategies when insulating approaches-which do not seek to alter people's underlying level of
bias-are feasible. However, insulating approaches lack a key advantage of
debiasing strategies; debiasing often has the virtue of avoiding significant
effects on those who do not exhibit bias in the first place." 4
Recall our earlier illustration of consumer optimism bias; government,
believing that consumers often underestimate the likelihood of injury from
risky products, restricts consumer choice in a variety of ways." 5 Such restrictions introduce new distortions in outcomes for those who did not err
in the first instance, as products are banned, more expensive, or otherwise
less available to them. By contrast, debiasing techniques may affect those
who are biased without much affecting those who are not."0 6 So too in the
context of antidiscrimination law: debiasing approaches target implicit bias
for reduction and thus are unlikely to affect those who initially do not show
implicit bias.'07
To illustrate the basic point here, return to the alternative analyses of
government affirmative action plans in Part II above. One analysis emphasizes insulation. On this account, affirmative action plans may protect outcomes from the effects of implicit bias-itself taken as a given-by
granting discrete preferences to members of a particular group.0 8 Here, as
applied to a particular decisionmaker who in fact harbors no implicit bias,
the government's action will introduce a distortion in, rather than a corrective to, decisionmaking; depending on the nature of the affirmative action
103. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
104. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 226, 228-30.
105. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
106. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 228-30.
107. We noted above, for instance, that substantial numbers of African-Americans do not show
significant levels of implicit bias. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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plan the alteration may be significant. °9 If a given decisionmaker evaluates
an African-American in a wholly unbiased fashion but the candidate nonetheless receives a thumb on the scale under an affirmative action plan, then
the plan causes, rather than insulates against, race-based decisionmaking.
The analysis differs with respect to the debiasing account of affirmative action. On this account, affirmative action, by increasing population
diversity, may reduce implicit bias-but there is no reason to think the increased population diversity will significantly alter the views of those who
did not show implicit bias in the first place. The perceptions of a decisionmaker who already has no trouble envisioning African-Americans in authority roles are unlikely to move substantially in response to increased
population diversity in the organization. Of course empirical testing would
be important to verify this conjecture, but debiasing solutions at least hold
out the possibility of leaving unaffected or less affected the decisionmaking of those who were not biased in the first instance. The use of a System
I response to a System I problem may be able to leave relatively untouched
those not exhibiting the System I problem in the first instance.'0
The system justification notion discussed above provides another example of the potential advantage of debiasing approaches. Consider the
suggestion of Blasi and Jost that, as a result of system justification tendencies, victims of biased behavior will often not mount legal challenges to
such behavior. 11' If so, one could imagine responding with policies greatly
lowering the legal barriers to bringing such challenges. But such steps
would naturally tend to affect the frequency of legal challenges even outside the set of cases in which system justification was depressing legal
challenges in the first instance. Again, debiasing strategies may avoid such
distortions in the behavior of those not exhibiting bias in the first instance.
IV
CONCLUSION

Antidiscrimination law, no less than any other area of law, should be
based on a realistic understanding of human behavior. If consumers underreact to certain risks, the law should take their underreactions into account.
And if individuals act on the basis of implicit bias against AfricanAmericans or other groups, without awareness that they are doing so, the
law should respond, if only because similarly situated people are not being
treated similarly. As in risk-related behavior, so too with implicitly biased
109. Again, Kang and Banaji ultimately limit their analysis to specific forms of affirmative action,
see supra note 52, so this problem would not be significant under their analysis.
110. Note, however, that as the example of government affirmative action illustrates, the same
measure may sometimes have both insulating and debiasing features; our point here is that the
debiasing features distinctively hold out the promise of leaving unchanged the decisionmaking of those
who were not biased in the first place.
Ill.
SeeBlasi&Jost, supranote91,at 1157.
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behavior: System I, involving rapid, intuitive responses, is often responsible for people's behavior, and it can lead them badly astray.
We have suggested the importance of distinguishing between two responses to implicit bias. Sometimes the legal system does and should pursue a strategy of insulation-for example, by protecting consumers against
their own mistakes or by banning or otherwise limiting the effects of implicitly biased behavior. But sometimes the legal system does and should
attempt to debias those who suffer from consumer error-or who might
treat people in a biased manner. In many domains, debiasing strategies
provide a preferable and less intrusive solution. In the context of antidiscrimination law, implicit bias presents a particularly severe challenge; we
have suggested that several existing doctrines now operate to reduce that
bias, either directly or indirectly, and that these existing doctrines do not on
that account run into convincing normative objections.
It is now clear that implicit bias is widespread, and it is increasingly
apparent that actual behavior is often affected by it, in violation of the principles that underlie antidiscrimination law. The question for the future, illuminatingly explored by the contributors to this Symposium, is how the
law might better deal with that problem.
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